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1 In settling the so-called “Irish question” between 1912 and 1922, two outcomes which could
not have been foreseen at the outset were that six of Ireland’s thirty-two counties would
be excluded from the jurisdiction of a Dublin parliament and that a majority of Irish
nationalists from those counties would consent to time-limited exclusion. This article has
two main aims. The first is to examine the thinking behind the Government’s decision to
exclude six full Ulster counties from the jurisdiction of the proposed Irish Home Rule
parliament. The second is to chart the gradual elicitation of a deeply reluctant consent
for  exclusion,  first  from the  Irish  Nationalist  political  leadership  and then from the
nationalist communities affected. As nationalists saw it, they were being asked to endorse
a strictly time-limited measure. However, explicit assurances that the exclusion would be
permanent were simultaneously included in government dossiers and, by 1916, given in
writing to Ulster Unionists in a move that would ultimately collapse the efforts of the
British government to solve the Irish question in 1916. The eventual resolution of the
issue would take another five and a half years and cost of several thousand lives through
the outbreak of guerrilla warfare in the south and sectarian pogroms in the north of the
island. 
2 On  11  April  1912,  the  third  attempt  to  pass  Home  Rule  legislation  for  Ireland  was
introduced to parliament at Westminster. At the end of September 1912, Ulster Unionists
had  formalised  their  opposition  to  the  Bill  through the  Ulster’s  Solemn League  and
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Covenant, a document which pledged its signatories to defeat Home Rule “using all means
which may be found necessary”. The document was signed by 237,368 men and a further
234,046  women  signed  a  corresponding  women's  “Declaration”.2 Ulster  unionist
opposition had been efficiently mobilised against the two previous attempts to pass Home
Rule legislation in 1886 and 1893.3 Since then,  the foundation of  the Ulster  Unionist
Council in 1905 had given further cohesion to anti-Home Rule sentiment. Both the Liberal
and Nationalist party leaderships thus expected robust resistance to the third Home Rule
Bill in 1912 but the “Ulster question” was lightly dismissed when Prime Minister Asquith
introduced the Bill in Parliament.4
3 Behind closed doors, members of Asquith’s Cabinet had been facing up to the realities of
the  Ulster  problem  for  months.  Lloyd  George  and  Churchill  had  proposed  special
accommodation for Ulster to Cabinet as early as February 1912.5 However, in public, the
government remained adamant that Home Rule would be an all-Ireland settlement and
insisted that universal safeguards written into the Bill, including on religious freedom,
would assuage the concerns of unionists and Protestants across the island.6 
4 On 11 June 1912, a backbench Liberal MP, Thomas Agar-Robartes, introduced the first
formal exclusion proposal to Parliament when, on the assertion that “I have never heard
that  orange  bitters  will  mix  with  Irish  whisky”,  he moved an amendment proposing the
exclusion of the four Protestant majority Ulster counties.7 Walter Long, the Conservative
MP and former Irish Chief Secretary, feared that this was a “very open trap” designed to
open up a schism within Unionism between those who would accept exclusion for a
portion of unionist Ulster and those who were not prepared to abandon the more isolated
pockets of unionism in Ireland’s three other provinces.8 While Long was keen to continue
his opposition to Home Rule on an all-Ireland basis, the majority of unionists in both
Ireland  and  Britain  now  favoured  some  special  consideration  for  the  north-eastern
portion of Ulster,  as an insurance policy should Home Rule be passed for the rest of
Ireland.9
5 The exclusion proposal highlighted the division between unionists in Ulster and those in
the rest of the island. While southern unionists hoped for universal safeguards, Ulster
unionists began to concede that Home Rule would become law in three of Ireland’s four
provinces. While accepting that the fate of unionists outside Ulster was all-but-sealed,
Ulster Unionists and their allies doubled down on their resolve to ensure by any means
necessary that the province would not be ruled by a Dublin parliament. The leader of
Ulster unionism throughout this period was the Dublin-born barrister and MP Sir Edward
Carson. At a time when compromises of all types were being proposed for Ulster, Carson
pushed an agenda of intransigence. In private, Carson’s view on the size of an excluded “
Ulster” was more nuanced. On 20 September 1913, in an often-quoted letter to Andrew
Bonar Law, Carson explained that “my own view is that the whole of Ulster should be excluded
but the minimum would be the six plantation counties, and for that a good case could be made.”10
Publicly, however, Ulster unionism would not flinch under the various concessions being
offered.11 Instead,  Ulster  Unionists  focused  on  preparing  their  resistance  should  an
attempt  be made to  impose Home Rule upon them.12 In  the background,  the British
Unionist party, which had been reformulated from the Conservative and Liberal Unionist
party in 1911, saw the Irish question, and Carsonism in particular, as the stick with which
to beat the ruling Liberal party. Their opposition to the government was intensified since
the 1911 Parliament Act removed the House of  Lords’  veto:  an in-built  safeguard for
Conservatives against any objectionable Liberal legislation emanating from the House of
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Commons.13 Ronan Fanning notes how British and Ulster Unionists saw the Parliament
Act as “revolutionary” and, that “perhaps we have our one and only chance of defeating it by
counter-revolutionary means.”14 
 
The Covenant, a year on
6 In the closing days of September 1913, a series of events occurred which jump-started
discussions  on  the  Ulster  crisis  following  months  of  relative  stasis.  Firstly,  on  24
September, six leading Unionists led by Sir Edward Carson put their name to a document
proclaiming a  provisional  government for  Ulster  in the event  of  the province “being
Forcibly Subjected to a Nationalist Parliament and Executive.”15
7 That weekend, a rally of 12,000 members of the Ulster Volunteer Force assembled outside
Belfast at the Balmoral Agricultural Showgrounds. During the demonstration, two flags
were  flown.  Firstly,  a  Union  Jack,  believed  to  be  the  largest  ever  in  existence,  was
unfurled. Second, a new flag for the breakaway province of Ulster was flown for the first
time. It had “a red hand and stars of each county of the new state of Ulster.”16 In the wake of
these two events – the launch of a provisional government and a show of strength by
Ulster’s rebel army – the British Unionist leader Andrew Bonar Law met with Winston
Churchill and told him the Tory party were now open to holding a conference and that
they had Carson on board.
8 The next day, on 28 September, at the other end of Ireland, the leader of the Home Rule
movement,  John Redmond,  visited the ancestral  home of  the nationalist  hero Daniel
O’Connell and, en route, gave a firm statement of his party’s position. He unambiguously
rejected the idea that Ulster could be excluded from any Home Rule settlement.17 While
holding the  door  open to  negotiation on any issue  save  that  of  exclusion,  Redmond
managed to stoke rather than ease tensions when he told his audience that “the whole
agitation in Ulster was but a gigantic and preposterous absurdity.”18
9 Irish  nationalism was  at  this  point  dominated  by  the  Irish  Parliamentary  Party,  the
pledge-bound  elected  MPs  who  consistently  held  approximately  three  quarters  of
Ireland’s seats in the House of Commons. Around John Redmond, the party chairman, his
three closest advisers were John Dillon, MP for Mayo East and the former leader of the
majority faction of Irish nationalism in the 1890s, T. P. O’Connor, the IPP’s only MP to sit
for a British constituency in the strongly Irish city of Liverpool. The fourth and youngest
member of this inner circle was Joseph Devlin, Secretary of the United Irish League from
1904, President of the Ancient Order of Hibernians from 1905, and, since 1906, MP for his
native West Belfast, a Catholic enclave within the otherwise Protestant majority city.19 
10 T. P. O’Connor played an important role during the Home Rule crisis. Resident in London,
O’Connor, a major media mogul, was close to leading members of the Liberal political
establishment,  especially David Lloyd George. On 30 September,  at the request of the
Prime Minister, Lloyd George sent for O’Connor and sought to ascertain the outlook of the
Irish party in light of recent developments.20 Immediately after the meeting, O’Connor
wrote to his friend and Irish party colleague John Dillon outlining the view he had formed
during  the  meeting  that  concessions  on  control  of  education  or  even  time-limited
exclusion  for  the  north-eastern  counties  were  now  worth  considering.  O’Connor
explained how
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L[loyd] G[eorge] certainly sees all the difficulties of our assenting to the exclusion
of Ulster – I mean, of course, in saying Ulster the four counties: – the desertion of
our friends etc. ... It is evident to me that the Tory Party as a whole, is somewhat
alarmed by the position of Carson and would grasp at any compromise which would
save their faces.21
11 O’Connor found that Dillon was away so, the following day, he wrote to Devlin explaining
how:
[Lloyd George] had proposed at the beginning of the struggle that Ulster sh[oul]d
get this option [of a plebiscite], feeling confident then that it would be refused, and
that he still thought this would have been wise tactics.22
[We] discussed quite calmly and amicably our difficulty in agreeing to a proposal
which would look like the betrayal of our fellow-Nationalists in Ulster.23
12 Devlin,  Dillon,  and  Redmond  all  passionately  felt  the  absolute  necessity  that  no
consideration should be given to concession, and that the rights of nationalists in all four
provinces should be defended at any cost. By contrast, O’Connor had now revealed that
he was willing to throw a still undetermined portion of Ulster open to a plebiscite.
13 Redmond, Dillon, and Devlin remained confident that the Home Rule Bill would become
law through its  preordained constitutional  pathway.  As  a  sign of  good faith,  and to
reinforce the message Redmond had delivered at Cahirciveen, Devlin took it upon himself
to write to the Chief Whip of the Liberal party, Percy Illingworth, on 7 November 1913.
Devlin explained that his letter was “purely personal and commits no one, but contains facts
they [the Liberal party] ought to know.”24 Devlin told Illingworth that there was widespread
distaste for any “shilly-shallying” over the resolution of the Ulster question and that on a
recent tour of Britain, “one note sounded clearly ... the note of ‘No Compromise.’”25 
14 Having found the Irish party intransigent, the Government was now forced to give some
level  of  recognition  to  the  growing  potential  for  trouble  in  Ulster.  What  should  be
remembered is that all of this occurred before 25 November 1913 when the pro-Home
Rule  Irish  Volunteers  were  founded  and  thus  the  only  extra-parliamentary  force  in
Ireland  was  the  Ulster  Volunteer  Force.  Faced  with  the  growing  popularity  of
paramilitarism among Ulster unionism, the government sought to assuage Carsonism.
Having  refused  to  agree  voluntarily  to  compromises,  the  Irish  party  would  now  be
prevailed upon to make concessions for Ulster.
15 Throughout the period O’Connor had been urging his colleagues to outline a clear Ulster
policy to the Prime Minister. Asquith had been receiving more readily offered suggestions
from the Unionist side. Andrew Bonar Law had met Asquith in early November and had
outlined his position, again in a purely personal capacity. While open to definitions on the
geographical  shape  of  the  excluded area,  Bonar  Law explained that  only  permanent
exclusion would satisfy the Unionist party. Hinting at the power behind his position and
the relative moderation of his stance, Bonar Law reminded Asquith that “he could not, of
course,  speak for the extreme men amongst  his  own supporters  or  amongst  the supporters  of
Carson in Ulster.”26
16 At a time when much of these policies was being articulated from speaking platforms and
in the press, the government urgently sought an opportunity to sit down with the Irish
party  and  talk.  On  13  November,  Asquith  wrote  to  Redmond  requesting  a  meeting
explaining that he was
… anxious to have a talk with you […]
I feel that in your speech at Newcastle you will be careful not to close the door to
the possibility of an agreed settlement.
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I will only add, for the moment, that I am by no means sanguine that anything of
the  kind  can  happen.  Nor  need  I  assure  you  of  the  firm  and  unshaken
determination of my colleagues and myself to attain with your help our common
object.27
17 On 17 November 1913, two meetings were held at Downing Street. In the morning, the
Prime Minister  spent  approximately an hour with Redmond.  In the afternoon,  Lloyd
George met Dillon with Percy Illingworth in attendance. In his meeting with Redmond,
the Prime Minister reported the contents of the conversation he had recently had with
Bonar Law. Asquith then discussed Ulster in frank terms with Redmond. He expressed his
concern, which was shared by the Cabinet, that it was now necessary to work towards “
some settlement which would avoid bloodshed in Ulster.”28 Asquith warned Redmond that:
the Carsonites were in possession of at least five thousand rifles – probably more –
and his information from the War Office with re-[gard] [sic] to the attitude of the
Army was  of  a  serious  character,  pointing  to  the  probability  of  very  numerous
resignations of commissions of Officers in the event of the troops being used to put
down an Ulster insurrection.29 
18 In his meeting with John Dillon, Lloyd George disclosed a separate but related revelation:
that the authorities had uncovered 95,000 rounds of ammunition in Belfast and were
working towards their seizure.30 
19 Three points of major significance arise from these meetings. Firstly, by November 1913,
Ulster  Unionists  were  showing  their  teeth  and  putting  force  behind  their  rhetoric
through  major  munition  importations.31 Secondly,  the  British  government  was  fully
aware of these shipments. Finally, and most importantly, these facts were being used by
the British government in order to turn the screw on the Irish party and to extract
concessions from Redmond and Dillon. 
20 Although  both  Asquith  and  Lloyd  George  were  keen  to  stress  that  they  in  no  way
envisaged offering concessions to Ulster immediately, the direction favoured among the
Cabinet was a scheme which had been drawn up by Lloyd George. It would have seen
Ulster (or a portion thereof) excluded from the jurisdiction of a Home Rule parliament for
a  period  of  five  years  after  which  time  Ulster  would  automatically  move  from
Westminster to Dublin control. All that the Government were asking at this point was
that the Irish party agree to the principle of this concession and that they would not
discount the possibility of compromise in the future. As Asquith put it to Redmond, “we
must, of course, keep our hands free, when the critical stage of the Bill is ultimately reached, to
take such a course as then in all circumstances seems best calculated to safeguard the fortunes of
Home Rule.”32
21 Whereas an official shift in in the Irish party leadership’s stance would not come until
March 1914, in acquainting Redmond with the facts of the Ulster situation, Asquith had
succeeded  in  winning  another  convert,  in  principle  only,  to  the  idea  that  a  special
accommodation  for  Ulster  would  have  to  be  made.  According  to  Lloyd  George’s
memoranda of his interviews with Dillon, he extracted an even more emphatic approval
for the idea of temporary exclusion “inasmuch as it was accompanied by the carrying into law
of Home Rule for the rest of Ireland”.33 F.S.L. Lyons questions the credibility of Lloyd George’s
interview, believing a situation where Dillon was more amenable to conciliation than
Redmond to be improbable to the point of disbelief.34 However, further evidence suggests
Lloyd George’s memoranda should not be rubbished entirely. In a letter to O’Connor after
his meeting, Dillon stated that “if we were forced to a decision now on the question of temporary
exclusion of Ulster – our decision must be a flat negative.”35 However, this does not mean that
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Dillon had rejected the principle of temporary exclusion. Lloyd George had been keen to
stress Dillon’s apprehension over the timing of an announcement of the Irish party’s
approval to time-limited exclusion. Dillon’s concern was over ‘when’ rather than ‘if’ the
Irish party would agree to the concessions.
22 Referring to his scheme for temporary exclusion, Lloyd George’s memo noted that:
[Dillon] was anxious the Irish leaders should be free during the next few months to
state that no proposal of the kind had been made to the other side, and that they
(the  Irish  leaders)  had  not  assented  to  such  a  scheme.  He  thought  that  if  put
forward  at  the  last  moment,  when  the  Bill  was  going  through,  it  [temporary
exclusion] might be tactically a very wise plan to propose, and that then the Irish
leaders might carry it in Ireland.36
23 All Dillon wished to clarify in his subsequent letter to O’Connor was that, if forced into a
decision now, the party would have to reject any idea of exclusion. In this same letter to
O’Connor, he confirmed this, stating that when negotiating with Lloyd George: “I kept
perfectly open mind [sic] to consider the proposition [of temporary exclusion] when the time came
and assented to accept it or reject it – after giving full weight to all the circumstances of the time.”
37 
24 Thus,  it  can  be  demonstrated  that  the  Government  had,  by  the  end  of  November,
succeeded in gaining approval, in principle, from three of the four members of the Irish
party’s inner leadership for temporary exclusion.38 This was a major coup and marked a
fundamental shift in the stance of the Irish party.
 
The last hurdle: Devlin
25 Lloyd George had noted Dillon’s concern that, while Dillon personally saw the merits of
Lloyd George’s  scheme,  “he anticipated difficulty  with Devlin,  whom he described as  being
perfectly  irreconcilable  in the matter  of  the exclusion of  Ulster.”39 Although Dillon did not
explicitly commit to any attempt to convert Devlin, Lloyd George recorded that “[Dillon’s]
attitude was friendly to the proposal of the Cabinet, and it was clear that if left to him to decide,
there would be no difficulty in obtaining the assent of the Irish Nationalists.”40 It is thus not
sensationalist to state that Redmond, Dillon, and O’Connor were keeping Devlin in the
dark following their meetings at Downing Street in November.41 Having been converted
to acceptance of time-limited exclusion, they now had to break the news to their Belfast
colleague, but this would have to be done sensitively. Dillon seemingly dreaded the task
and was anxious that Devlin should not receive any premature half-truths about the
complicated nature of the arrangement he had arrived at with Lloyd George. In an early
communication following his return to Dublin, Dillon chastened O’Connor, informing him
that  “I  cannot  communicate  your  letter  to  Joe  Devlin  –  because  of  the  sentences  conveying
impression that I have agreed to temporary exclusion of Ulster.”42
26 O’Connor had brought Devlin to see Lloyd George in December and did not fare well in
finding any accommodation between the two.43 Reflecting the difficulty his colleagues
faced in reaching out to Devlin, O’Connor wrote to Dillon in the closing days of 1913,
appearing almost to have recanted his acceptance of concessions for Ulster. He told Dillon
that “[a]ny form of exclusion of Ulster will place us in an almost impossible position. I fear that we
should lose Devlin and all he represents, and you know what a loss that would be to us.”44 A. C.
Hepburn  writes  that  the  feeling  in  British  political  circles  was  that  Devlin  would
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eventually  be  converted  by  his  colleagues,  and  that  Dillon  would  be  pivotal  to  this
conversion.45 
27 February witnessed the culmination of the crisis. In a rather panicked note to Dillon on 2
February, Redmond explained that Asquith was coming under extreme pressure from his
own party to make concessions on Ulster and that a split in the Cabinet was possible. Even
more gravely, Redmond said that Asquith had told him how the King was “thoroughly
frightened” by the Ulster situation. Because of all this, Asquith told Redmond that it was “
quite essential for him [Asquith] to make an explicit offer to Ulster at once”.46 
28 Redmond, Dillon, and O’Connor now redoubled their efforts to convince Devlin of the
need to compromise.  Historian A.  C.  Hepburn highlights observations made by T.  M.
Healy  to  his  brother  Maurice  in  early  February  1914  that  “Devlin’s  colleagues  were
concealing the truth of the situation from him” and that although Healy himself felt that “
Devlin cannot give in ... I see Dillon arguing with him constantly.”47 As a result of this campaign
of  conversion,  the  will  of  the  majority  finally  won  out  and  Devlin  signalled  his
exasperated capitulation on 20 February 1914 when he wrote a memorandum on his
stance on Ulster, copies of which now reside among Redmond and Lloyd George papers.48
29 Here, Devlin acceded to three concessions for Ulster: “the inclusion of ‘Ulster’ with the right
of going out after a trial period [of ten years]”; extra representation for Ulster in the Irish
Parliament;  and  “such  an  arrangement  of  the  Senate  as  would  afford  them  an  additional
safeguard against unfair treatment.”49 What is of the utmost significance here is that Devlin
had not consented to time-limited exclusion but to full inclusion while “permitting ‘Ulster’ to
claim exclusion after, say, ten years”.50 It seems that nobody either among Devlin’s party
colleagues or Cabinet cared too much that Devlin had conceded to inclusion rather than
exclusion. Hepburn explains how Lloyd George seized upon Devlin’s memorandum and
wrote a skilfully crafted justification of his belief in time-limited exclusion rather than
temporary inclusion.51 
30 At a meeting between members of the government and the Irish party leadership on 3
March, Devlin finally capitulated, agreeing to the Lloyd George scheme for temporary
exclusion.52 Fanning notes how Lloyd George had “disingenuously agreed” to Redmond’s
stipulation that this concession “would be their last word.”53 This thus marked the end of a
difficult and divisive chapter in the history of the Irish party leadership.
 
Drawing the border and the origins of permanent
exclusion
31 In the wake of Devlin’s conversion, Nationalist acceptance for the principle of strictly
time-limited  exclusion  was  complete.  However,  this  fact  was  not  public  knowledge.
Redmond, Dillon, O’Connor and Devlin met with Asquith and Lloyd George on 2 March
and, in a memorandum subsequently submitted by Redmond, the Irish party formally
agreed to “the standing out for three years by option of the counties of Ulster as the price of peace
.”54 
32 The government now quietly began to make contingency plans by drawing up the area to
which exclusion might apply. It is in this phase the modern Irish border began to take
shape and was first put on paper. The groundwork began immediately and, on the same
week that Devlin came on side (3 March), a government white paper was drafted. Almost
immediately, the three year time limit was pushed out to six and the revised white paper
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was made public when Asquith moved the second reading of the Home Rule Bill on 9
March.55 As per Lloyd George’s plan, it proposed that, on petition and on a county-by-
county basis, Ulster counties would be allowed to exclude themselves from the operation
of the Home Rule Bill for a yet-to-be-determined number of years.56 Exactly a month later,
on 6 April, a new set of proposals was circulated to Cabinet. One of the most significant
alterations between the March white paper and the April Cabinet proposal was that “the
six excluded counties [were] not to be included in the Irish unit of self-government unless by their
own consent”.57 The government persisted for over two more years in claiming to the Irish
party leadership that the proposals for exclusion were strictly time-limited. However,
this document shows that, from April 1914 onwards, the British government agreed to
the principle  that  no move would be made to coerce or  impose the reunification of
Ireland  after  its  supposedly  temporary  partition.  Given  the  absolute  majority  of
Protestants – which roughly but not entirely mapped onto unionism – the possibility of
any permutation of Ulster territory opting by ballot for inclusion in a Home Rule Ireland
after the period of exclusion had elapsed was remote in the extreme. 
33 Although  the  Lloyd  George  scheme  was  predicated  on  the  principle  of  four-county
exclusion, the lines of demarcation for the excluded area were still very much up in the
air throughout the period from March to July 1914. At the Irish Office, Chief Secretary
Augustine Birrell began requesting information and proposals for a boundary line for the
excluded area simultaneous to the printing of the government’s white paper.58 Birrell
drew upon the expertise of three senior civil servants to help determine the shape of the
exclusion zone. These were Birrell’s Undersecretary, Sir James B. Dougherty; W. F. Bailey
of the Estates Commissioners Office; and Sir H. A. Robinson, Vice-President of the Irish
Local Government Board. 
34 Dougherty  was  an  Ulster-born  Presbyterian  and  a  pro-Home  Rule  Liberal.  Bailey,
meanwhile, had been secretary to the royal commission on public works in 1886 and had
travelled the length and breadth of the country in this capacity.59 He reminded the Chief
Secretary  of  his  “rather  intimate  knowledge”  of  religious  opinions  in  Ulster.60 As  for
Robinson, he came from an Anglo-Irish Protestant (Anglican) ascendancy family and was
“bred for the public service.”61 If Robinson’s 1923 memoir is to be believed, he had a close
personal relationship with Birrell and was a trusted adviser to him throughout Birrell’s
term as Chief Secretary (1908-16).62 Robinson was seen by Birrell as an expert on the
political  geography  and  demographics  of  Ireland.  Virginia  Crossman  claims  that
Robinson’s  knowledge  of  the  Irish  localities  was  “unrivalled  within  Dublin  Castle”.63
Robinson  had  played  a  leading  role  in  framing  and  implementing  the  1898  Local
Government Act. This included the re-division of Ireland’s 159 poor law unions into 213
rural districts contiguous with county borders. In the process, the county borders were
themselves redrawn for half of Ireland’s counties.64 As such, Robinson had been central to
drawing the very boundaries which, sixteen years later, were at the centre of the Ulster
impasse. 
35 In his memoirs Robinson, who admitted to having been “tarred with the Unionist brush and
… not a trustworthy person from a Nationalist point of view”, said that Birrell saw him as “a sort
of liaison officer for legislative work between [Birrell] and the Unionists.”65 Presently, the extent
to which Robinson looked out for Unionist interests in proposing his boundary line will
be examined. Birrell set 6 May as the deadline for receipt of proposals from his three
advisers. 
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36 Taking  W.  F.  Bailey  first,  although  his  maps  have  been  separated  from  their
accompanying correspondence,  it  is  possible  to  reconstruct  from his  description and
tables the boundaries of the excluded area he proposed.66 Of the three, the Bailey scheme
was  the  most  disruptive  and  paid  little  heed  to  existing  administrative  boundaries.
Instead, Bailey relied on physical geography to craft a more visible border. In Fermanagh,
Bailey cut straight through both of the county’s parliamentary divisions,  running his
boundary  line  directly  up  the  middle  of  the  Erne  waterways system.67 Of  the  three
schemes,  Bailey’s  was  the  only  one  in  which  his  accompanying  notes  made  no
acknowledgement of the scheme’s temporary nature.68 Thus, while Nationalists were still
working under the premise that they had consented to temporary exclusion, one official
was drawing two clearly identifiable and separate regions using west-Ulster’s waterways
to create a solid and discernible line of separation.69
37 Bailey’s scheme was the most rushed of the three and included some questionable calls.
Bailey proposed the inclusion of the entire parliamentary division of North Monaghan
within the unionist area.70 Monaghan was a county nobody else was even considering in
their permutations and the portion Bailey chalked for exclusion had a two-thirds Catholic
majority. Because his boundary line sliced through existing administrative units, it was
impossible for Bailey to accurately estimate how many of the almost 1.2 million people he




38 By far the most thorough of the three exclusion schemes was that devised by Sir Henry
Robinson. In drawing his boundary line, Robinson took local government boundaries as
his operational unit, a method the Undersecretary would later dismiss as unworkable.72
The Robinson scheme proposed the exclusion of 1,178,586 persons from the operation of
the Home Rule Act. This amounted to 26.85 percent of the population of Ireland and, at
£4,545,708, 28.58 percent of Ireland’s land by valuation.73 Robinson’s exclusion zone was
two-thirds Protestant and one-third Catholic. Of the three, Robinson’s boundary line was
the only one which explicitly considered infrastructural factors such as road and rail
connections.74 Even though Robinson’s line was not ultimately adopted, his justifications
are highly instructive in explaining the policy thinking underpinning the final shape of
the Irish border, especially the inclusion of the two Catholic majority counties, Tyrone
and Fermanagh, and the majority Catholic city of Derry. 
39 On the eastern end of the boundary line, the Robinson scheme showed considerably more
sympathy to Catholics than simple six-county exclusion. Robinson left south Armagh and
south Down, including the heavily Catholic town of Newry, within Home Rule jurisdiction.
By contrast, in the western half of Ulster, Robinson made a number of sweeping decisions
that  excluded  large  swathes  of  territory  with  solid  Catholic  majorities  from  the
jurisdiction of Home Rule. 
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40 Arguably the most interesting variable which Robinson considered in drawing his line
was “the degrees of obstreperousness in the rival sectarian factions on the border line.”75 In terms
of  appeasing  volatile  sectarian  communities,  Robinson  bent  to  both  nationalist  and
unionist  extremists.  Of  Crossmaglen  nationalists,  he  opined  that  they  “are  about  the
warmest lot I know.”76 In Fermanagh, Robinson’s justification was even more illuminating.
Here he justified the inclusion of an area with a 3,000-strong Catholic majority because “
there has been more money spent on armament and drilling here than in any part of the county
and these Enniskillen and Lisnaskea Protestant farmers are the most bloodthirsty set of ruffians I
know”.77 Fearing  a  contagion  effect  in  Cavan  and  Monaghan,  Robinson defended  the
exclusion of these districts as “there would be no peace or settlement along the whole border
line if these people were left out.”78 Bailey had applied the same logic to justify the inclusion
of  North Monaghan and the whole of  Tyrone,  the Protestant  minorities  of  which he
described as being “very strong and … better drilled and armed than in almost any part of the
Province.”79
41 Despite all  of  his careful  work and calculations,  Robinson virtually cast all  this aside
towards the end of his letter to Birrell stating: “I expect you will find that the Ulstermen’s
minimum will  be six entire counties in and no option … Personally,  I  agree about no option




42 Of  Birrell’s  three  advisers,  the  most  reluctant  was  his  second-in-command,
Undersecretary  Sir  James  Brown Dougherty.  While  Bailey  and Robinson replied  with
detailed, even enthusiastic suggestions on the 6th, Dougherty replied on the 7th making
apologies  that  a  prior  engagement  had delayed him and saying how it  would  be  “a
difficult, if not impossible job to construct these pens” and that “the policy of exclusion, whatever
plan may be adopted, bristles with difficulties and at the moment I confess I do not see how they
are to be surmounted.”81 
43 Dougherty provided his full memorandum five days later on 11 May with his comments
on  the  merits  and  demerits  of  dividing  the  province  by  local  government  areas,
parliamentary divisions, and full counties.82 Of these, Dougherty’s preference was for the
scheme which was ultimately adopted: the county option. Dougherty’s rationale focused
largely on the administrative headache he foresaw in dealing with an otherwise excluded
area  in  which local  government  boards,  county  councils,  and existing  parliamentary
constituencies would be split across two jurisdictions.83 
44 All three schemes recommended that Ulster’s second city, Derry, which had a Catholic
majority, be put into the exclusion zone. Robinson argued that it was “impossible to keep
the maiden city out of the parent County”.84 Dougherty reminded his Chief Secretary that “the
City  of  Derry  has  strong  sentimental  attractions  for  the  Ulster  Protestant,  and  it  is  the
headquarters of the County administration” adding that “it is unlikely the ‘Covenanters’ will now
consent to see the City excluded from Protestant Ulster.”85
45 Dougherty was a native of Garvagh on the other side of county Derry.  Alongside the
Catholic enclave constituency of West Belfast, the Derry conundrum seems to have been
one of the cases which convinced Dougherty of the merits of whole-county plebiscites
over constituency option.  By having Derry’s county and city constituencies vote as a
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single unit,  Derry city’s 56 percent Catholic majority was negated.  With a reliable 54
percent overall Protestant majority, the full county looked certain to vote itself, including
its maiden city, out of the jurisdiction of a Home Rule parliament. The manufacturing of
majorities to suit desired outcomes had thus crept into policy thinking on the area for
exclusion. If the Derry question could be solved by county option, the same logic did not
settle the question of what to do with Fermanagh and Tyrone. With a combined Catholic
majority  of  64  percent,  the  decision over  these  two counties  would impact  upon an
additional 204,501 Catholics for the sake of 113,755 Protestants.
46 Despite declaring for whole-county option, Dougherty fudged his answer to the question
of  whether  four  or  six  counties  should  be  excluded.  His  rationale  for  four-county
exclusion was based on the fact that such a scheme would create “a tolerably compact area”
but he seems on balance to have conceded that six counties would be the more realistic
outcome due to the fact that “it  is  difficult  to see how the Ulster Covenanters in the four
included  Counties  can  abandon  their  brethren  in  Tyrone  or Fermanagh.”86 No  more  than
Robinson,  Dougherty was  conceding to  the power of  force  and threat  in making his
decisions over Ulster.
47 In light of the above, following the Nationalist leadership’s accession to the principle of
strictly time-limited exclusion in March, Dublin Castle favoured full six-county exclusion.
Despite the strong preference in Dublin for full county exclusion, it has been suggested
that the other permutations were not entirely cast aside. Brendan O Donoghue makes a
convincing case  that  copies  of  various  maps,  including Robinson’s  6  May map,  were
circulated  among  attendees  at  the  Buckingham Palace  Conference  in  July  (discussed
subsequently) when it came to discussing permutations for an area for exclusion that
might be acceptable to both Nationalists and Unionists.87
48 As the table below illustrates, the exclusion of six full counties was the least sympathetic
of the available options.  However,  from the perspective of administrators full  county
option had the advantage of being the least disruptive from a governance perspective.
However, the power of unionism was the overriding factor. 
 
Summary of the schemes for the excluded area of Ulster, May 1914.
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The Buckingham Palace Conference, July 1914
49 The culmination of the Government’s efforts to solve the Ulster crisis came in July. This
was after the Sarajevo crisis had broken but before the violation of Belgium’s neutrality
brought a not-so-United Kingdom into the War. In an effort to clear Ulster from the
political landscape as the continental crisis intensified, a conference was called under the
auspices of the King at Buckingham Palace, sitting for four days between 21 and 24 July.
Here, representatives of both the Ulster and British Unionist parties sat opposite Lloyd
George and the Prime Minister representing the Government with Redmond and Dillon
representing the Nationalist party. Hepburn sees Devlin’s exclusion from the Conference
as notable.88
50 At the sessions of the conference, the question of time limit was set aside by mutual
agreement and the opposing parties decided instead to focus on the proposed area for
exclusion.89 By engaging in this exercise, Redmond and Dillon further confirmed their
acceptance of the principle that a certain portion of Ireland would have to be excluded
from Home Rule for an undetermined length of time.
51 The Buckingham Palace Conference is often seen as the moment at which the partition of
Ireland began to take shape.90 However, it has been shown here that the leadership of the
Irish party had conceded in private to the principle of exclusion months before this point.
In a sense, the conference was an attempt to draw both sides into the open, forcing them
to  make  public the  concessions  they  had  already  made  in  private.  If  this  was  the
Government’s intention, it backfired spectacularly. Buckingham Palace was remembered
for the intransigence of both parties. As Asquith recorded, Redmond and Carson faced
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each other saying “I must have the whole of Tyrone, or die; but I quite understand why you say
the same”.91 The conference ended in utter stalemate. 
 
War and Rising: Nationalist desperation and Ulster
exclusion
52 The  First  World  War  put  the  Home  Rule  question  on  ice.  Irish  recruits  from  both
communities were needed to populate the armies of the Empire and both the Ulster and
Irish Volunteer movements were tapped into in the scramble to fill the ranks.92 On 18
September, the Government of Ireland Bill was passed into law without any amendment
dealing with the Ulster question. However, beside it was placed a Suspensory Act which
postponed the coming into operation of the Government of Ireland Act, initially until
September 1915, but this period was extended in increments throughout the war and
beyond until a two-state solution was inaugurated with fresh legislation in 1920.93
53 If  the  First  World  War  halted  the  progress  of  the  Irish  question,  the  1916  Rising
jumpstarted  the  whole  process.  Just  as  he  had  played  the  leading  role  in  pre-war
deliberations, Lloyd George was again tasked by Asquith with settling the Irish question.94
Within days of the last rebel execution on 12 May, Devlin travelled to London to hold
preliminary meetings with Lloyd George alongside T. P. O’Connor. In one of the most
significant of these early meetings, Lord Northcliffe, as a friend of Lloyd George’s and an
Irishman by birth, met Devlin to sound out possible terms for settlement.95 In the course
of  their  discussions,  which  naturally  centred  on  the  Ulster  question,  Devlin  told
Northcliffe  that  he  felt  an  immediate  settlement  for  Ireland  was  of  paramount
importance  following  the  Rising.96 For  this  to  have  come  from  Devlin,  as  the  only
Nationalist leader representing Ulster, was a clear signal to Lloyd George that there was
some fertile ground for a settlement in the Nationalist camp. However,  a letter from
O’Connor to Dillon three days later  gives a  little  more insight  into Devlin’s  personal
misgivings on the subject. Here, O’Connor told Dillon that he had
... been with Joe almost night and day ... he [Devlin] is a man of somewhat uncertain
moods,  as  you  know,  and  now  and  then  he  relapses  into  regrets  that  he  ever
consented to help us with regard to Ulster two years ago; and things of that kind,
which to me are sheer madness.97
54 O’Connor went on to explain that, despite these private misgivings, he was confident that
Devlin would fall into line with the rest of the leadership, saying that “[t]his, however, is
not his [Devlin’s] ordinary mood, and I think I am justified in regarding him as in entire agreement
with ... Redmond and myself.”98 R. F. Foster has described Redmond as “desperate ... to achieve
any settlement going” following the Rising. This extended as far as conceding to the loss of
Fermanagh and Tyrone whose exclusion had been so vehemently opposed by Redmond at
Buckingham Palace.99
55 Lloyd George’s proposal was the same as his 1914 scheme in all its essential details but
this time the area for exclusion was, as the government had been planning for since
before the war, full six-county exclusion. The 1916 proposals would see the immediate
enactment of Home Rule for twenty-six counties only, and the continued attendance of
Irish MPs at Westminster for the duration of the War. Once the European conflict had
ended, an Imperial Conference would be held to forge a final settlement for Ulster.100 With
the Nationalist leadership now prepared to accept temporary six-county exclusion, the
Lloyd George scheme would be put to a representative convention of nationalists from
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the affected counties on 23 June 1916. It would fall upon Devlin to convince his flock that
their temporary sacrifice was necessary to save the dream of Home Rule for Ireland. In
what  Eamon Phoenix has  dubbed “pre-meditated  duplicity”,  Lloyd George gave written
assurances  to  Carson  that  the  border  would  be  permanent  while  he  simultaneously
allowed  Redmond  to  acquiesce  in  the  belief  that  partition  would  be  of  a  strictly
temporary  nature.101 This  double  cross  is  what  would  ultimately  scupper  the  1916
negotiations by the end of July.102 
56 Returning to the Ulster Nationalist convention, the late Tony Hepburn has undertaken
the most comprehensive analysis of the assembly of Ulster nationalist delegates which
was held at St. Mary’s Hall Belfast on 23 June 1916. Following a forty-five-minute speech
by Devlin  in  support  of  a  policy  upon which he  himself  still  harboured doubts,  the
convention voted to support Lloyd George’s proposals: 475 delegates in favour and 265
against.103 Historian R.  B.  McDowell  issued the caveat that,  of the 270 delegates from
Fermanagh, Tyrone, and Derry City, an overwhelming 183 (68 percent) voted against the
proposals.104 McDowell’s point emphasises a new division that was emerging within Ulster
politics.  This  schism  was  not  between  nationalism  and  unionism  but  rather  within
nationalism itself. Taking the River Bann as a dividing line, nationalists in the east of the
area for exclusion, centring on Devlin’s native Belfast began to sober up to the fact that
they would likely find themselves excluded from the jurisdiction of an Irish parliament
under any circumstances. By contrast, nationalists of Fermanagh, Tyrone, and Derry city,
finding themselves on the margins of the proposed exclusion zone hoped that they could
be placed under the rule of a Dublin parliament through a revision of the boundary lines.
105 Ultimately,  this  divide  would  push  this  latter  group  towards  the  emergent
revolutionary republicanism of Sinn Féin whereas Devlin held sway among his faithful
followers in Belfast. 
57 In the context of understanding the shape of the modern Irish border and in charting the
path which led to nationalist acceptance of it, the 1916 Belfast conference represents a
crucial juncture and the final milestone in the trajectory which this article intends to
chart. The temporary exclusion which had been agreed to in principle by the Irish party
leadership in March 1914 was now endorsed by a representative assembly of nationalists
from the affected area. Although partition would take years to become a reality, all of its
essential parts had been assembled by the summer of 1916.
 
Conclusion
58 The period 1912-16 witnessed a complete reversal  in Nationalist  policy on the Ulster
question. Beginning with intransigent rhetoric about an indivisible island, by 1916 both
the leaders and the followers of the Irish party had conceded willingly to the temporary
partition of Ireland. However, the seeds of permanency were sown by their stance.
59 Nationalists at all times acknowledged the principle of consent over coercion. In practice,
this signalled permanent exclusion and this maxim had been written into a secret cabinet
proposal as early as 6 April 1914. Consent was part of the nationalist vision for a unified
and united Ireland under Home Rule.  They did not  want to win a united Ireland by
bloodshed. Despite their professed adherence to the principle of consent,  nationalists
clung to the idea that exclusion would be subject to strict legal time limits. Their logic
was predicated on the idea that they could win unionists in the excluded territory over by
their exemplary governance. However, so long as nationalists held on to the reasonable
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and democratic idea that Ulster should not be compelled by force to enter the jurisdiction
of  a  Home  Rule  parliament,  the  overwhelming  likelihood  of  permanent  exclusion
remained a fact. 
60 Regarding the area for exclusion, if the principle of consent was firmly established in
April 1914 then the rationale for excluding six full Ulster counties was determined by the
Irish Office in May 1914. Following the impasse at the Buckingham Palace Conference in
July, exclusion was hardwired into any future settlement. The point here is that both the
shape and nature of the Ulster solution were all-but-set prior to the outbreak of the First
World War. Nationalist delegates from the six counties were forced to go through the
rigmarole of giving their approval to Lloyd George’s scheme a full two years after it had
been determined to be the only remaining viable option. 
61 The negotiation of the Ulster question should be seen as an example of the pre-war secret
diplomacy which Woodrow Wilson derided in the advent of the Paris Peace Conference. In
Ulster’s case, all the major players knew most (but not necessarily all) of the parameters
long  before  these  were  put  to  the  populations  who  would  have  to  live  with  the
consequences.  The manufacturing of majorities prior to the holding of any plebiscite
should likewise sound a note of caution to historians of Europe after the Armistice.
62 Irish historiography charts the origins of partition to the 1920 Government of Ireland Act;
the establishment of the devolved Northern Irish state in July 1921; and the signing and
ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty between December 1921 and January 1922. What this
article demonstrates is  that,  six years before any of this,  the scheme and shape of a
permanently excluded six-county Ulster had been determined by a man who was then the
Chancellor of the Exchequer but would go on to become Prime Minister from December
1916 until October 1922. In this later phase, Lloyd George oversaw the implementation of
all  of  these  ideas  and  witnessed  the  decline,  departure, or  death  of  many  of  the
participants he had tangled with in the first phase of the crisis including Asquith, Carson,
Devlin, Dillon, and Redmond. 
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ABSTRACTS
In  April  1912,  Prime  Minister  Herbert  Henry  Asquith  introduced  the  third  Home  Rule
(Government of Ireland) Bill to Westminster. In so doing, he ignited a crisis in both Ireland and
Britain  which  consumed political  discourse  right  up  to  the  eve  of  the  First  World  War  and
beyond.  By  September  of  1912,  the  Ulster  question took centre  stage  as  the  dominant  issue
holding back the constitutionally predetermined progress of the Government of Ireland Bill.
This article considers two important developments pertaining to Ulster within the broader Home
Rule crisis. The first is the definition and rationalisation of a two-state solution to the so-called
‘Irish question’ which in 1914 resulted for the first time in the drafting of proposals for an Irish
border, initially as a strictly temporary measure. The second theme here is to examine how, from
November 1913 onwards, Nationalist politicians gradually and grudgingly came to accept, on a
strictly temporary basis, the exclusion of a portion of the province of Ulster from the jurisdiction
of a Home Rule parliament. 
This culminated in the summer of 1916 with a convention of nationalist delegates from the six
Ulster counties earmarked for exclusion. At this conference, the leading Nationalist MP in Ulster,
Joseph Devlin, prevailed upon his followers to vote themselves temporarily out of a Home Rule
Ireland  so  as  to  ensure  the  immediate  enactment  of  Home  Rule  for  the  rest  of  the  island.
Although the deal upon which this pact was predicated failed,  it  marked the moment where
Ulster nationalists  consented to the principle of  partition.  The partition of Ireland became a
reality in 1921 and has remained the bedrock of the two-state solution to the Irish question ever
since.
En avril  1912,  le  Premier  ministre  Herbert  Asquith  introduisit  le  troisième projet  de  loi  sur
l’autonomie de l’Irlande (Government of Ireland Bill) au Parlement de Westminster. Ceci déclencha
une crise qui influença le discours politique aussi bien en Irlande qu’en Grande-Bretagne et ce,
jusqu’à la veille de la Première Guerre Mondiale et après. En septembre 1912, la question d’Ulster
se trouva au centre des débats et devint l’obstacle prinicipal au progrès du projet de loi tel que
défini par la constitution.
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Cet article examine deux éléments importants relatifs à l’Ulster dans le contexte plus large de la
crise liée à la question du Home Rule. En premier lieu il s’agit de comprendre comment fut définie
et rationalisée une solution à deux Etats à la question irlandaise, ce qui aboutit en 1914 à une
ébauche des propositions de frontière irlandaise – solution qui, au départ, devait être strictement
temporaire. Dans un second temps, il s’agira d’examiner comment, à partir de novembre 1913, les
nationalistes en vinrent à accepter progressivement, à contre-coeur et sur une base strictement
temporaire que soit exclue de la jurisdiction d’un parlement irlandais autonome une portion de
la province d’Ulster.
La crise culmina à l’été 1916 lors d’une convention réunissant des délégués nationalistes de six
comtés d’Ulster et destinée à décider l’exclusion. Dans ce contexte, le chef de file des députés
nationalistes d’Ulster Joseph Devlin, convainquit ses soutiens de voter l’exclusion temporaire de
leurs comtés afin que la mise en place immédiate de l’autonomie législative pour le reste de
l’Irlande puisse être assurée. Bien que l’arrangement sur lequel reposait ce pacte se fût soldé par
un échec,  ceci  marqua le  moment  où les  nationalistes  d’Ulster  acceptèrent  le  principe  de  la
partition. Cette partition d’Irlande devint une réalité en 1921 et demeure le fondement de la
solution en deux Etats à la question irlandaise.
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